Nebraska Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 2

Article 6

1982

Searching for a Liberty Interest: The Prisoner's
Right to Due Process: Connecticut Board of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981)
David DeTar Newbert
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
David DeTar Newbert, Searching for a Liberty Interest: The Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101
S. Ct. 2460 (1981), 61 Neb. L. Rev. (1982)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol61/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Note

Searching for a Liberty Interest:
The Prisoner's Right to Due
Process
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct.
2460 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1960s saw the apparent demise of the federal
courts' "hands off" policy' regarding actions brought by inmates
incarcerated throughout the nation's prisons. 2 In the last ten years
1. The "hands off" policy was a judicially self-imposed limit on federal review of
prisoner grievances which was based on deference to prison authorities.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The rationale for this reluctance to
intervene in prison administration was the assumption that courts lacked the
expertise and administrative capacity required to improve prison conditions
and that court intervention would subvert and undermine prison discipline.
Id. The subsequent result would be the irreparable damage to the prison
system. Id. Because this policy operated as a jurisdictional bar to prisoners'
complaints, it enabled federal courts to avoid any constitutional review of
prison administrative decisions. Referring to the policy, Justice Powell
observed:
Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude
toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the
product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude
springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the
problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for
securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape,
and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too
apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the
point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Id. at 404-05 (footnotes omitted). For a good discussion of the rationale and
effect of the hands-off policy, see Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963).
2. The Supreme Court appeared to abandon the hands-off policy in Cooper v.
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an explosion 3 of claims have been filed in federal courts by prisoners seeking relief for a wide range of grievances. 4 The courts have
addressed important questions regarding prisoners' rights protected by the United States Constitution.5 In ConnecticutBoard of
Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), when it indicated that it would subject prison administrative decisions to constitutional constraints. In Cooper, a prisoner alleged
that he had been denied permission to purchase certain religious publications solely because of his religious beliefs. The Court reversed the lower
court decisions that had dismissed the prisoner's complaint based on the
view that federal courts had no business supervising prison officials. See Calhoun, The Supreme Courtand the ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners:A Reappraisal,4 HASTrNGS L.Q. 219,220-24 (1977). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,
321 (1972).
3. Petitions filed by state and federal prisoners represent a substantial portion
of the workload of federal courts. In recent years, cases dealing with prisoner
grievances have accounted for as much as 18% of all civil filings. See AD=vn'ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 9395 (1976). For example, filings by state prisoners rose from around 200 in
fiscal year 1966 to nearly 7,000 in fiscal year 1976, an increase of over 3000% in
only 10 years. THE UNITED STATES CouRrs: A PCTORIAL SumAnRY 4 (1976).
In 1974, state and federal prisoners filed 18,410 petitions of various types in
the district courts. Of this total, state prisoner civil rights suits accounted for
5,236. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADmiNisTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE
UMiTED STATES CouRrs 42-45 (1974). Justice Brennan, in Rhodes v. Chapman,
101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981), noted that there are currently pending over 8,000 cases
filed by prisoners challenging prison conditions. Id. at 2402 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Prisoners challenge the conditions of their confinement in state prisons in
the federal courts either by habeas corpus actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976) or by civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). A petitioner
seeking a writ of habeas corpus must first exhaust state remedies. See Note,
Prisoners,1983, and the FederalJudge as Warden, 9 TOl. L REV. 873, 890
(1978). A complaint filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) must allege specific conduct by state officials acting under color of
state law which violates some constitutional right of the prisoner.- Frequently
these complaints contain allegations attacking prison disciplinary procedures, censorship, medical care, etc. and are brought by the inmates against
wardens, prison directors, and guards. See cases cited infra notes 4-5; Alper,
Due ProcessBehind Bars, 49 FA.a_ B.T. 240 (1975).
4. Claims have run the gamut from the serious to the absurd. See, e.g., Sparks
v. Fuller, 506 F.2d 1238 (1st Cir. 1974) (inmates complained about the eviction
of their pet cats that had been obtained without official consent); Freeman v.
Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974) (prisoner claimed to have been denied
access to specialized treatment after he had contracted tuberculosis from his
cellmate); Stubblefield v. Henderson, 475 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1973) (prisoner
fied a petition demanding that he be allowed access to a typewriter for his
correspondence); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (D. Del. 1977)
(allegation that insufficient staff led to an "increase in theft, assault, and homosexual rape").
5. Answers to some issues addressed include: United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394 (1980) (poor prison conditions do not justify-escape from prison); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (inmates do not have a
constitutional right to parole); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (body cavity
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Pardonsv. Dumschat,6 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the lower court decisions, found that inmates who were denied
commutation of their sentences by the Connecticut Board of Pardons without any explanation possessed no liberty interest pro7
tected by the due process provision of the Constitution.
Over twenty years ago the Court noted that due process is an
"elusive concept,"8 whose "exact boundaries are undefinable." 9

6.
7.

8.
9.

searches of pretrial detainees do not violate their fourth amendment rights);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to serious and
essential medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative of the eighth amendment); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976) (prisoner who is arbitrarily transferred to another prison has no due
process protection against such transfer); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308
(1976) (permitting an adverse inference to be drawn from an inmate's silence
at his disciplinary proceeding is not, on its face, an invalid practice); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (state-created prisoner right to good-time
credits cannot be forfeited without due process); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974) (prisoners have no first amendment right to face-to-face interviews
with journalists); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (interest of prisoners in uncensored mail is a liberty interest protected by the United States
Constitution); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee is entitled to
a preliminary hearing by someone not directly involved in his case); Younger
v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (state must furnish prison inmates with access
to extensive law libraries). At the lower court level, prisoners' claims for redress have often been effective. "In fact, individual prisons or entire prison
systems in at least 24 states have been declared unconstitutional under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392,
2402 (1981) (Brennen, J., concurring).
101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981).
Procedural due process requirements apply to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the 14th amendment's protection of "liberty" and "property." This amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person "of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
Id. The Court in Hannah further observed that "due process embodies the
differing rules of fair play" which through the years have become associated
with different types of proceedings. Id. Whether the Constitution requires
that a particular right be available in a specific proceeding depends upon several factors including the "nature of the alleged right involved," the "nature of
the proceeding," and the '"possible burden on that proceeding." Id. This language became the basis for the due process test put forth by the Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For the substance of this test,
see note 51 infra.
The Court has since indicated that when determining whether an interest
merits due process protection, it will focus on the "nature of the interest at
stake," not its "weight." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). In
addition, the Court will look at whether the deprivation of the interest will
force the individual to suffer a "grievous loss." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471,481 (1972). The Court has observed "that due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id.
Many controversies have arisen regarding the cryptic and abstract wording of
the due process clause, but the Court has been relatively consistent in finding
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Nowhere is this fact more evident than in the series of Supreme
Court decisions, culminating with Dumschat,o which attempt to
address the question, "What constitutes a valid liberty interest for
prison inmates?"" In order to facilitate an understanding of the
current state of prisoners' protected rights, this Note will first discuss the historical development of those rights. It will then examine the Dumschat opinion in light of the Court's previous
decisions regarding prisoners' due process rights. Finally, this
Note will discuss Dumschat's role in the Court's continued narrowing of the threshold criteria required for prisoners to establish liberty interests worthy of constitutional protection.
II HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
"It is hardly earth-shattering to observe that prisons are not
Brownie Camps."' 2 The American judiciary initially viewed the
convicted criminal as having, "as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those
which the law in humanity accords to him. He is for the time being
the slave of the state."' 3 This harsh view generally prevailed well
into the twentieth century when federal courts began to acknowledge that a prisoner retained at least some rights,14 including the

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

that, at a minimum, these words require that deprivation of life, liberty, or
property by adjudication cannot occur without notice and an opportunity to
be heard. These two elements are the mainstays of due process protection.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
The series includes: Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460
(1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
Due process generally protects traditional interests such as the ownership of
real and personal property as well as providing protection from arbitrary
practices in the criminal justice system. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420
(1960). A "liberty interest" or "entitlement" is an interest derived from the
relationship between the individual and government that extends beyond the
scope of these customary concerns. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571-72 (1972). See Note, Due ProcessBehind Bars-TheIntrinsicApproach,48
FoPDH
L. REV. 1067 (1980). Constitutional liberty interests originate from
such sources as state and federal statutes, administrative practices, contractual arrangements, and mutual understandings, conduct, and comprehension
of government and citizen.
People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 826, 118 CaL Rptr. 110, 111 (1975).
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
The change in attitude was reflected by the court's statement in Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944):
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.
While the law does take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude
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right of access to a federal forum.1 5 The Supreme Court decided
that a prisoner had a right to review by writ of habeas corpus to
16
challenge the legal and constitutional merits of his confinement.
Even though the Court held that prisoners had no due process protections in their discretionary transfers from one prison to another
prison which was "less agreeable,"' 7 the Court decreed that an inand observance of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners, it does not deny his right to personal security against unlawful
invasion.
Id. at 445.
15. See, e.g., Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965), where the court
ruled that the tradition of judicial abstention from review of prison matters
could not justify the court's failure to protect inmates' access to the court Id.
at 690-91. In Talley, prisoners who had testified about bad conditions at the
prison farm had been beaten, and the farm administration had refused to forward prisoners' petitions to the court. Id. at 687-89. The due process right of
access to the courts was first enunciated at the Supreme Court level in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). In Johnson, the Court held that prohibiting
so-called 'jailhouse lawyers" (inmates with legal skills who helped other inmates with paper work) from assisting other prisoners prevented, for all
practical purposes, illiterate inmates from having their claims heard. Id. at
487. More recently the Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts" requires prison authorities to help inmates prepare and file meaningful legal papers by providing them with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). For an informative discussion
of the prisoner's right to access, see Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access:
Does Bounds have Bounds?, 53 IND. L.J. 207 (1978). Other federal court decisions have established that prisoners have various rights. See, e.g., Bowring
v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977) (the right to reasonable psychiatric and
psychological treatment); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977)
(the right to fire protection); Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972)
(the right to adequate heat); Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Pa 1976)
(the right to adequate light and ventilation); Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp.
534 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (the right to physical exercise); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (the right to nutritious food three times a day that
is prepared under sanitary conditions); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F. Supp. 1252
(N.D. Ill. 1974) (the right to adequate sanitation); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (prisoners' right to go to sleep without having their
throats cut during the night). For an interesting discussion of prison conditions in Arkansas prisons in the 1960s, see Comment, Prison Reform in the
Federal Courts, 27 BUFFALo L. REV. 99 (1978).
16. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
17. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). The Court held that the transfer of
state inmates to a prison where living conditions were "substantially more
burdensome" than at the first prison did not constitute a deprivation of a liberty interest protected by due process in the absence of a state statute or
practice conditioning transfers on serious misconduct. Id. at 224-27. In a majority opinion by Justice White, the Court refuted the notion that any grievous loss sustained by a person at the hands of the state is sufficient to trigger
due process. Id. at 224. The court also dismissed the view that "any change
in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the
prisoner" was enough to require 14th amendment protection. Id. (emphasis
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mate imprisoned for the commission of a crime could not be involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital for psychiatric treatment8
without first being afforded additional due process protections.
The Court also held that a state-created prisoner's right to goodtime credits,' 9 which could only be forfeited for serious misbehavior, constituted a liberty interest protected by the due process
clause. 20 Prisoners were afforded the right to enjoy substantial
22
religious freedom 2 ' and protected against racial discrimination.
Further, deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical
needs was held to constitute "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" and, hence, was prohibited. 23 The Court also established

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

in original). As a result, the Court found that discretionary decisions by
prison authorities need not be subjected to due process constraints because
those decisions do not infringe on any protected right. Id.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Appellee Jones was convicted of robbery
and sentenced to three to nine years at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex. Pursuant to NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-180 (Reissue 1976), Jones was involuntarily transferred to the security unit of a state mental institution without notice or opportunity to oppose the transfer. 445 U.S. at 480. The Court
asserted.
None of our decisions holds [sic] that conviction for a crime entitles
a State not only to confine the convicted person but also to determine
that he has a mental illness and to subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental hospital. Such consequences visited on the
prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a crime.
Id. at 493. The Court observed that it was "indisputable that commitment to a
mental hospital can engender adverse social consequences to the individual"
including probable social "stigma," id. at 492, and that "the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatconstitutes the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires
ment ...
procedural protections." Id. at 494. The Court decided that such a "grievous
loss" by the prisoner required a due process hearing. Id. at 488.
Good-time credits against a sentence serve as a reward for good behavior in
prison. If an inmate does not violate the rules for a stated length of time, he
is entitled to have his sentence reduced. Ordinarily seven to ten days are
subtracted for each month of time served without misbehavior. See Jacob,
Prison Disciplineand Inmate Rights, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 227 (1970).
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Court considered an
inmate's constitutional challenge to administrative decisions affecting prison
conditions and discipline and noted that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime." Id. at 555. The
Court held that since prisoners in Nebraska could only lose good-time credits
if they were guilty of serious misconduct, the procedure for determining
whether such misconduct had occurred must observe minimal due process
requirements. Id. at 557. See notes 83-85 & accompanying text infra & note 95
in fra.
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, the Court adopted the standard of "deliberate indifference" to apply to cases involving eighth amendment claims. Id. at 104. The Court did not choose the most liberal standard
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that prisoners had the right to send and receive mail without censorship 24 and possess and 25read materials that did not interfere
with prison administration.
These strides forward in the area of prisoners' rights represented a modern trend that recognized that prisoners were still
human beings, 26 yet avoided the result of coddling the criminal.
The problem of how best to balance the interests of society
against the interests of the individual prisoner has continued to
perplex all parties concerned. 27 Traditionally, the public interest

24.

25.
26.

27.

available. For example, mere negligence would not be actionable. Id. at 10506. See Klein, Prisoners'Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A Modern Expansion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 7 FORDHAm URnB. L.J. 1 (1978).
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The Court struck down rules propounded by the California Department of Corrections that had directed inmates not to write letters which "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances"
and prohibited "contraband writings expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs." Id. at 399. The Court ruled that
"[t]he interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a 'liberty' interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though
qualified of necessity by the circumstance [s] of imprisonment." Id. at 418.
Lash v. Aikens, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
In his concurring opinion in Procunier v. Martinez, Justice Marshall assertedWhen the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his
human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for
self-realization concluded. If anything, the needs for identity and
self-respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison
environment.
416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
In the landmark decision of People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 826,
118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1974), the court outlined criteria that would afford prisoners a limited defense for prison escape if the escape were based on duress
and necessity, and further stated:
When our culture abandoned such unpleasantries as torture, dismemberment, maiming and flogging as punishment for antisocial behavior and substituted in their place loss of liberty, certain problems
immediately presented themselves. As a "civilized" people, we demanded that incarceration be under reasonably safe and humane
conditions. On the other hand, we recognized that the institutional
authorities must be afforded a certain firmness of program by which
the malefactors could be kept where sentenced for the allotted period of time.
In Moody v. Daggett, the Supreme Court referred to the "parallel interests" of
society and the parolee. 429 U.S. 78, 86 (1976). This "parallel interest" concept can be applied to many situations involving prisoners. The need for a
mutual accommodation between the institutional (societal) needs and objectives in maintaining discipline and the constitutional provisions that sometimes extend to prisoners was discussed in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
556 (1974). Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights
and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a "retraction justified by the considera-
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was deemed to outweigh the individual prisoner's rights.28 One accepted view was that constitutional protection turned, upon
whether a governmental benefit was characterized as a "right" or
as a "privilege." Although a right was entitled to due process protection, a privilege could be revoked without such protection because it was granted by the state's generosity.29 The Court firmly
rejected this so-called right/privilege distinction over ten years
ago. 30 Certain prisoners' rights that were formerly characterized
as privileges have now been recognized as protected liberty interests.3 1 Yet confusion about the role of the courts in determining
how far to extend prisoners' rights remains. For example, our nation's highest Court declared: "Federal courts sit not to supervise

28.
29.
30.

31.

tions underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266,285 (1948).
"But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of
institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555 (1974). The Court in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), perhaps
best summed up society's interest in the corrections process:
An important function of the corrections system is the deterrence
of crime. The premise is that by confining criminal offenders in a
facility where they are isolated from the rest of society, a condition
that most people presumably find undesirable, they and others will
be deterred from committing additional criminal offenses. This isolation, of course, also serves a protective function by quarantining
criminal offenders for a given period of time while, it is hoped, the
rehabilitative processes of the corrections system work to correct the
offender's demonstrated criminal proclivity. Thus, since most offenders will eventually return to society, another paramount objective of
the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those committed to its
custody. Finally, central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves. It is in the light of these legitimate penal objectives
that a court must assess challenges to prison regulations based on
asserted constitutional rights of prisoners.
Id. at 822-23.
People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 826, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 112 (1974).
See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 740 (1964). See also Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935).
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971), where Justice Blackmun
stated: "[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights
turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a
'privilege."' The distinction was considered outdated and no longer useful.
The complex and expansive concepts of liberty and property cannot be
"neatly pigeonholed" and the Court's rejection of the right/privilege distinction represented recognition of this reality. See Note, supra note 11, at 1070.
See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 HAnv. L REV. 1439 (1968).
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 399 n.1 (1974) (argument that sending
and receiving mail was a privilege rather than a liberty interest was rejected).
Compare Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (probation as privilege)
with Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (probationer can no
longer be denied due process based on Zerbst right/privilege distinction).
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prisons.... We are not unmindful that prison officials must be
accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs." 32 Yet, in
almost the same breath the Court stated that it does sit "to enforce
33
the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners."
These two statements made in the same paragraph indicate the
complexity and ambiguity that pervades the area of prisoners'
rights litigation today. It was through this enigmatic lens that the
Court focused on the facts of Dumschat.
III. THE DUMSCHAT DECISION
A.

Lower Court Opinions

In 1964, David Dumschat was sentenced to life imprisonment
for the murders of his former wife and the doctor for whom she
worked. 34 Under Connecticut law, Dumschat was ineligible for parole until December of 1983,35 unless the Connecticut Board of Pardons commuted his sentence. The Board of Pardons was
empowered to commute sentences of life inmates; the form of relief it most frequently granted was the commutation of an inmate's
minimum sentence to time served.36 This consequently acceler32. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
33. Id. at 321. See Comment, Confronting the Conditionsof Confinement: An Expanded Role in Prison Reform, 12 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L REv. 367 (1977).
34. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 432 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (D. Conn. 1977), rev'd,
101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981); Brief for Respondents at 9, Connecticut Bd. of Pardons
v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981).
35. Until 1971, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-121 (1958) (repealed 1971) provided"[W] hen any person is sentenced to the state prison, otherwise than for life
or in connection with a sentence of execution for a capital offense, the court
imposing the sentence shall establish a maximum and minimum term for
which such convict may be held in such a prison." Under Connecticut law,
only prisoners who have served their minimum terms of imprisonment are
eligible for parole. Id. § 54-125 (1972). However, persons sentenced to life incarceration, like Dumschat, have no minimum terms and become eligible for
parole only after having served 20 to 25 years in prison, depending upon the
good time which they have earned. Id. In 1971, the Connecticut legislature
enacted a new statute, CoNN.GEN. STAT. § 53a-35 (1977), which required sentencing judges to affix minimum terms of from 10 to 25 years to life sentences.
Thus, if Dumschat had been sentenced under the new penal code, he might
have become eligible for parole. See Brief for Respondents at 2, Connecticut
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981).
36. The authority for the Connecticut Board of Pardons is contained in CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 18-26 (Supp. 1981) which provides:
(a) Jurisdiction over the granting of, and the authority to grant, commutations of punishment or releases, conditioned or absolute, in the
case of any person convicted of any offense against the state and
commutations from the penalty of death shall be vested in the board
of pardons.
(b) Said board shall have authority to grant pardons, conditioned or

19821

PRISONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

ated the inmate's eligibility for parole.37 Once eligible for parole, a
determined
separate state body, the Connecticut Board of Parole,
38
whether the inmate should be released on parole.
Dumschat applied for commutation of his sentence on several
occasions; however, the Board of Pardons rejected each application without explanation.3 9 In February of 1976, Dumschat instituted an action in federal court claiming that he had been deprived
of a federally protected right within the purview of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.40 He based his claim on the fact that the Board of Pardons
had consistently denied him a pardon without providing him a
statement of reasons and asserted that he was entitled to such a
the due process clause of the fourteenth
statement under
41
amendment.
After hearing testimony from officials of both the Board of Pardons and the Board of Parole, the trial judge concluded that due
process attached to the denial of a pardon to an inmate like Dumschat who had served nearly two-thirds of his minimum term.42
Thus, the court held that under the fourteenth amendment the
Board of Pardons was required to provide Dumschat a written
statement of reasons and facts it relied on in denying his pardon
request.43
In reaching this result, the court rejected the contention that
due process might be denied in parole proceedings on the ground
that parole was a "privilege" rather than a "right."4 4 The court

37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

absolute, for any offense against the state at any time after the imposition and before or after the service of any sentence.
Id. The Connecticut Board of Pardons is a state agency established pursuant
to CoNN.GEN. STAT. § 18-24a (1977), which provides that the Board consist of
five members: two attorneys, one person skilled in the social sciences, one
physician, and a Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Brief for Respondents at 3.
101 S. Ct. at 2462.
Brief for Petitioners at 11. The usual process includes three determinations:
the judge imposes a life sentence, the Board of Pardons commutes the sentence, and finally the Board of Parole discharges the prisoner from custody.
See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2467-68 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Brief for Petitioners at 3.
Id.
Id.
432 F. Supp. at 1315 n.17.
Id. at 1315.
Id. The court relied on several factors and followed the rationale behind the
holding in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 927-28 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom, Regan v. Johnson, 419
U.S. 1015 (1974), which interpreted the Court's decision in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey held that parole was to be treated as a
conditional liberty representing an interest entitled to due process protec-

tions. The Morrissey Court outlined minimum safeguards:
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found unacceptable the Board of Pardon's argument that it was
sometimes difficult to articulate reasons for denial, especially in
45
instances where the inmate was felt to be hopelessly incorrigible.
Instead, the court relied on the showing that at least seventy-five
percent of all life inmates received favorable action from the Board
of Pardons prior to completing their minimum sentences and that
virtually all the pardoned prisoners were promptly paroled.46
Thus, the court reasoned, the long-term inmate's expectation of a
pardon was "rooted in state practice" 47 and was justifiable.4 8 The
court further noted that the possibility of arbitrary action by the
Board of Pardons was not unreal and that the articulation, of reasons would help ensure that a decision had some basis in the record before the board.49 Finally, the court declared that a statement

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. In following the Morrissey decision, the court in United States ex.
rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d
Cir.), vacated sub nom, Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), noted:
A prisoner's interest in prospective parole, or 'conditional entitlement,' must be treated in like fashion [as a conditional liberty entitled to due process protection]. To hold otherwise would be to create
a distinction too gossamer-thin to stand close analysis. Whether the
immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are the same:
conditional freedom versus incarceration.
500 F.2d at 928. The Dumschat district court observed that the same factors
which led the court in Johnson to find a liberty interest in an inmate's expectation of parole applied in the case of the denial of a pardon by the Connecticut Board of Pardons. Dumschat v. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons, 432 F. Supp.
1310, 1313 (D. Conn. 1977), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981).
432 F. Supp. at 1315.
Id. at 1314-15. Mr. Gates, Chairman of the Connecticut Board of Parole,
stated that based on his 35 years of experience with the Connecticut correctional system, "at least 75 percent of all lifers received some favorable action
from the pardon board prior to completing their minimum sentences." Id. at
1314. Gates testified: "'[I]n the vast majority of cases, I would say 90 percent
of the cases at least, a commutation by the Pardons Board results in parole
by the Parole Board."' Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1315. The court explained:
The board hears some 60 petitions in a given sitting. After the completion of the evidence in the cases heard during the day, the board
goes into executive session. Typically, the secretary to the board
reads the name of the applicant .... If all members remain silent,
the petition is denied. There is no assurance that each of the mem-
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of reasons would serve a rehabilitative function by informing the
prisoner what his application lacked as well as suggesting how he
might better himself in order to obtain a pardon in the future. 0
Referring to the procedural due process test in Mathews v. Eldridge,51 the trial court compared the nature of the inmate's interest and the need for procedural safeguards with the public's
interest in maintaining the existing procedures and asserted, "I
think its [sic] plain that the balance tips decidedly in favor of the
inmate and the articulation of a statement of reasons." 52 Responding to post-judgment motions, the court allowed other inmates to
53
intervene and certified the suit as a class action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision.5 4 The Board of Pardons then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
which was granted on June 11, 1979.55 The Court ordered that the
judgment be vacated and the case remanded5 6 to the court of appeals for further consideration in light of the Court's decision in
Greenholtz v. Nebraska PenalInmates.57 In Greenholtz, the Court
bers has actually considered all the information contained in the file
or that the members are applying a consistent set of criteria.

Id.
50. Id.
51. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court stated that due process was
neither a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place,
and circumstances nor was it inflexible. Id. at 334. It instead calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Id. The Court
set forth a test to help identify when administrative procedures are constitutionally sufficient:
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
52. Dumschat v. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons, 432 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (1977), rev'd,
101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981).
53. 432 F. Supp. at 1315. On the day that the court entered its declaratory judgment, the Board commuted Dunschat's sentence to time served and granted
him immediate release. The Board then moved to dismiss the suit as moot.
The court denied the Board's motion and permitted three other inmates to
intervene. Those inmates, like Dumschat, were also serving life terms for
murder and had been denied commutation without any explanation. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2462 n.5 (1981).
54. 593 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 926 (1979).
55. Id.
56. Dumschat v. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons, 442 U.S. 926 (1979).
57. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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held that a prisoner had no inherent or constitutional right to parole because it was impossible for him to maintain a liberty interest in parole prior to his actual release once he had been duly
convicted.5 8 On remand of Dumschat, the court of appeals reaffirmed its original decision.5 9 The Connecticut Board of Pardons
again petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari which was
granted on October 14, 1980.60
B.

Supreme Court Decision

The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions and held that the mere existence of the Connecticut Board
of Pardons' power to commute a lawfully imposed sentence created no right or entitlement in the inmates beyond the right to
58. Id. The Court compared a prisoner's hope for freedom as being "no more
substantial than the inmate's hope that he will not be transferred to another
prison, a hope which is not protected by due process." Id. at 11. The Court
did hold that, because Nebraska had statutorily created the required liberty
interest in its parole process, Nebraska's inmates were protected by due process protections. Id. The Court was careful to observe that the Nebraska
statute had a "unique" structure and that the determination of whether any
other statute created a liberty interest in parole would have to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 12. The Nebraska statute provides that the
Board of Parole "shall" order an inmate's release "unless" the Board concludes that his release should be deferred for at least one of four specified
reasons. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1) (1976). These reasons are:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or
promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially diverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance
his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later
date.
Id. See Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Due Processin ParoleRelease HearingsGreenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 28
KAN. L. REv. 635 (1980); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Due Process-StateProceduresfor GrantingDiscretionaryParoleHeld to Comport with Requirements
of ProceduralDue Process, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 665 (1980).
59. 618 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981). The Second Circuitobserved:
Upon reconsideration, we affirm our earlier conclusions that
(1) the consistent issuance of pardons to inmates serving life
sentences in Connecticut has given them a protected 'liberty' interest in the pardons process, and (2) the due process rights which attend this protected interest require that life inmates receive written
explanations of adverse decisions by the Board of Pardons.
618 F.2d at 217.
60. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 266 (1980).
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seek commutation. 61
The respondents argued that the Board's consistent practice of
granting commutations to most life inmates had evolved into an
"unwritten common law of sentence commutation and parole acceleration" 62 for Connecticut life inmates and thus was sufficient
to create a protectible liberty interest.63 The respondents asserted:
"Through its consistent policy and practice of reducing the minimum terms of life inmates, the State Board has encouraged these
prisoners to rehabilitate themselves, to maintain exemplary institutional conduct records and to expect that meritorious commuta64
The
tion petitions will be fairly considered and granted."
respondents further claimed that the expectation of sentence commutation was not unilateral because the state had generated
within the inmates a well-founded belief that they would be released if they controlled their institutional behavior.6 5 As a result,
an unspoken understanding existed between the state and the in66
The terms
mates which held out mutual benefits for both sides.
cooperate[d]
inmate
"If
the
simple:
of the understanding were
with the State, the State [would] exercise its parole power on the
inmate's behaf."67 The respondents asserted that both the state
and the inmate recognized these terms, with each expecting the
other to abide by them.68 As a result of this understanding, the
State of Connecticut benefitted by diminished tensions within the
prison system and savings in both manpower hours and other rereceived favorable action
sources, while the inmates supposedly
69
regarding their commutation requests.
Maintaining that the Court had consistently looked to the practices of state agencies in determining whether the state had created a legitimate expectation entitled to due process protection,
the respondents urged the Court to embrace its opinion in Perryv.
In that case, the Court emphasized that mutually
Sinderman.7
explicit understandings need not have a basis in written docuConnecticut Bd.of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (1981).
Id. at 2464.
Id.
Brief for Respondents at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The respondents further asserted that "an atmosphere of cooperation is
thereby engendered [when prisoners conform to institutional policies] at the
state's penal institutions which makes it easier for the State to attract and
retain competent employees." Id. And further that the state benefitted when
inmates cooperated and volunteered their services to the state when they
were not legally bound to do so. Id.
70. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Brief for Respondents at 16.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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ments to create a legitimate claim of entitlement.7 1 The Court in
Perry analogized the circumstances which generate such understandings to implied contracts and to unwritten common law,
adding that they may also be based on the policies and practices of
72
an institution.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by six
justices, the Court flatly rejected the respondents' arguments, stating: "Our language in Greenholtz leaves no room for doubt."7 3 The
Court agreed with the petitioners' contention that the requirement
of written explanations of adverse pardon decisions would encumber, for no good reason, those states where the authority to pardon
was liberally used.74 Describing an inmate's petition for a pardon
as merely an appeal for clemency, the Court compared an inmate's
expectation that a lawfully imposed sentence would be commuted
with an inmate's expectation that he would not be transferred to
71. 408 U.S. at 601, 603. The Court in Perry observed: "'[P]roperty' interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, 'property' denotes a broad range of interests that are
secured by 'existing rules or understandings."' Id. at 601 (quoting Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). The respondents in Dumschat observed that the Court had never recognized a difference between liberty and
property interests as far as the creation of legitimate claims of entitlement
were concerned, citing the Court's decision in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 533, 542 (1972). In Lynch, the Court held that it had "never
adopted the distinction between personal liberty and proprietary rights" with
respect to jurisdiction conferred on the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1976), one of the provisions enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
405 U.S. at 542. The Court in Lynch went on to say:
[T] he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights
is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights.
The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less
than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal'
right, whether the 'property' in question be a welfare check, a home,
or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other.
Id. at 552.
72. 408 U.S. at 601-03.
73. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2463 (1981). The
Court asserted:
There is no constitutionalor inherent right of a convicted person
to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.
The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable
from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with
all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right:
'[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.'
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)).
74. See Brief for Petitioners at 9.
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another prison, stating: "[I]t is simply a unilateral hope.175
The Court acknowledged that the State of Connecticut had conferred "unfettered discretion"7 6 on its Board of Pardons and
stressed that a state cannot be required to explain its reasons for a
decision when it is not required to act on prescribed grounds.77
The Court further declared: "A constitutional entitlement cannot
'be created' merely because a wholly and expressly discretionary
state privilege has been granted generously in the past."78 Chief
Justice Burger emphasized that the ground for a constitutional
claim must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising clemency, and that
of futhe frequency of past grantings or the statistical probability
79
ture grantings generated no constitutional protections.
The Court also discussed the "critical difference" between the
denial of a prisoner's request for initial release on parole and the
revocation of a parolee's conditional liberty, comparing the subjective nature of the commutation decision with the objective aspects
of parole revocation.8 0 At this juncture, Chief Justice Burger reiterated the Court's holding in Greenholtz that an inmate has no
8
constitutional or inherent right to commutation of his sentence. 1
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2464.
76. Id. at 2465. The Court observed that the court of appeals had "correctly recognized" that Connecticut had conferred "unfettered discretion" on its Board
of Pardons, but had, paradoxically, then proceeded to "fetter" the Board with
the "halter" of constitutional "entitlement." Id. See Dumschat v. Board of
Pardons, 618 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981).
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2465. For the Board of Pardons' statutory authority, see note 36 &
accompanying text supra.
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2464 (emphasis in original) (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,
444 n.5 (1979)).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2460. The Dumschat Court contrasted Connecticut's pardoning
procedure with Nebraska's statutory procedures which the Court had addressed in Greenholtz. Id. at 2465. The Dumschat Court referred to the
unique structure and language of the Nebraska statute which provided for
mandatory parole in certain circumstances. For the Nebraska parole procedures, see note 58 supra. In Connecticut there were no such "explicit standards" set forth by way of statutes or regulations. 101 S. Ct. at 2465. Further,
the petitioners pointed out the Connecticut Supreme Court's interpretation
of Connecticut's parole statute, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125 (1972), in Taylor v.
Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 372 A.2d 102 (1976). See Brief for Petitioners at 11.
In Taylor, the court held that the statute simply provided that an inmate who
has served his minimum sentence may be paroled at the discretion of the
board of parole, but that there was no statutory requirement that the board
actually consider the eligibility of any inmate for parole. 171 Conn. at 697, 372
A.2d at 106. The court further stated that the statute did not vest an inmate
with the "right to demand parole" and that there was no statutory provision
which even permitted an inmate to apply for parole. Id. at 697,372 A.2d at 106.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2464.
81. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
"There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and
the prisons of this country."8 2 This language is from the landmark
decision of Wolffv. McDonnell,83 in which the Court held that due
process protections are necessary when an inmate is deprived of
"good-time" credits.84 Although acknowledging that the Constitution itself did not guarantee good-time credits for satisfactory behavior while in prison, the Court concluded that because the state
had statutorily provided this right, a prisoner's interest in maintaining his good-time credits had real substance and was embraced within fourteenth amendment liberty.85
In searching for a liberty interest that is relevant to the "very
different situation" 86 present in prison, it is necessary to compare
several factors discussed in Dumschat with prior Court holdings.
Close scrutiny of the Dumschat opinion reveals questionable reasoning when compared to earlier Court decisions.
A.

The Critical Difference

It is important to note the Dumschat Court's choice of words.
The Court referred to Connecticut's pardon process as a "'discretionary state privilege ... granted generously in the past.' "87
Such language is difficult to reconcile with the Court's opinion in
Graham v. Richardson,88 where it rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a right or as a privilege. The Dumschat language
appears to indicate the Court's willingness to rekindle the supposedly refuted right/privilege distinction in a "not-too-deceptive
82. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
83. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
84. In Wolff, Nebraska inmates brought a claim for damages and injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). They alleged, among other things, that certain
disciplinary proceedings at the penitentiary had violated due process. The
Court held that because Nebraska's disciplinary scheme permitted good-time
credits to be withheld or forfeited only as a consequence of an inmate's serious misconduct, the procedure for determining whether such misconduct had
occurred was required to observe certain minimal due process safeguards
(though not the full range mandated in other Court holdings for parole and
probation revocation hearings). 418 U.S. at 556-72. See notes 19-20 supra.
85. 418 U.S. at 557.
86. Id. at 560. The Wolff Court stated: "[I]t is immediately apparent that one
cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an
open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to
the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state

prison." Id.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 444 n.5 (1979)).
88. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). For a discussion of Graham, see note 30 supra.
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disguise." 89
The Dumschat Court enthusiastically embraced the restrictive
language of Greenholtz, in which the Court differentiated between
parole release and parole revocation because of the nature of the
decision in each instance.9 0 While a parole-revocation decision
often involves a wholly retrospective factual question and thus is
objective, the parole-release decision is more subtle and depends
on an "amalgam of elements,"9 1 some factual, but many. more
purely subjective appraisals based on parole board members' experience. 92 Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Greenholtz, criti-

cized the Court's conclusion that an important difference of
constitutional dimension exists between a deprivation of liberty
one has and a denial of liberty one desires.93 Justice Marshall fur89. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Bd. of Parole, 500
F.2d 925, 927-28 n.2 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom, Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015
(1974). For a discussion of the rejection of the right/privilege distinction, see
note 30 & accompanying text supra.
90. 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1979).
91. Id. at 9-10.
92. Id. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part to the Greenholtz
decision, reacted to the Court's narrow distinction between parole release
and parole revocation, stating:. "I am unpersuaded that this difference, if indeed it exists at all, is as significant as the Court implies." Id. at 19. (Powell,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In addressing the Court's conclusion that parole release and parole revocation were different because there is
a "difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants,"
id. at 9-10, Justice Powell asserted that if there was any systematic difference
between the factual inquiries relevant to release and revocation determinations, this difference would be "too slight to bear" on the existence of a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at 27 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall stated that "Morrissey afforded constitutional recognition to a parolee's interest because his
freedom on parole includes 'many of the core values of unqualified liberty.'"
Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). Justice Marshall
asserted. 'This proposition is true regardless of whether the inmate is presently on parole or seeking parole release. 442 U.S. at 27. (emphasis added).
He further stated. "Contrary to the Court's assertion that the decision to revoke parole is predominantly a 'retrospective factual question,' Morrissey
recognized that only the first step in the revocation decision can be so characterized... Morrissey thus makes clear that the parole revocation decision
includes a decisive subjective component." Id. at 28.
Following the decision in Morrissey, the Court held that the requirements
of due process established for parole revocation were also applicable to probation revocation proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The
Court added to the required minimum procedures established in Morrissey
the right to counsel under certain circumstances. Id. at 790. Quoting from
Morrissey, the Court discussed the conditional nature of parole, stating:
"[T]he revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution. 'Parole
arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence.... Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly
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ther asserted that the Court's holding in Wolffv. McDonnel194 had
acknowledged that a prisoner could implicate a liberty interest in
good-time credits, even though the forfeiture of the credits only deprived the prisoner of freedom he expected to obtain sometime in
the future.95
In the Dumschat opinion, Chief Justice Burger described the
petition for a pardon, in each case, as nothing more than an appeal
97
for clemency.9 6 He stated that the case did not involve parole.
This conclusion is questionable at best, given the close interrelationship existing between the Board of Pardons and the Board of
Parole. In reality, at least for a large number of inmates, the request for a pardon was the requiredfirst step in Connecticut's parole process.9 8 The Dumschat Court's attempt to draw fine
distinctions between complex issues perhaps indicates a hesitancy
on the Court's part to refute its landmark decision in Morrissey v.
Brewer9 9 in which it observed the important role of parole in modem society:
During the past 60 years, the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part of the penological system. Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole
is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.... It
also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an individual in
prison.1 0 0

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

dependent on observance of special parole restrictions."' Id. at 781. (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissentingin part). Justice Marshall further asserted: "[T]his Court has repeatedly concluded that the Due Process Clause protects liberty interests that
individuals do not currently enjoy." Id. The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell had
stated.
For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same
immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee.
The deprivation, very likely, does not then and there work any
change in the conditions of his liberty. It can postpone the date of
eligibility for parole and extend the maximum term to be served, but
it is not certain to do so, for good time may be restored. Even if not
restored, it cannot be said with certainty that the actual date of parole will be affected; and if parole occurs, the extension of the maximum term resulting from loss of good time may affect only the
termination of parole, and it may not even do that. The deprivation
of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance.
418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974). In his dissent in Greenholtz, Justice Marshall
stated: "Whether an individual currently enjoys a particular freedom has no
bearing on whether he possesses a protected interest in securing and maintaining that liberty." 442 U.S. 1, 26 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
101 S. Ct. at 2464.
Id.
See notes 35-38 & accompanying text supra.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Id. at 477.
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In Morrissey, the Court held that parole revocation required due
process and further observed that even though a parolee's liberty
interest was conditional rather than absolute, the parolee nevertheless retained significant freedoms.'01 The Court also asserted
that a parolee's liberty included "many of the core values of unqualified liberty"' 02 and that attempts to revoke those values must
be accompanied by fourteenth amendment safeguards.103 Thus,
despite the fact that an individual's parole was merely conditional
and did not interrupt the state's legal custody I 04 a protectible liberty interest existed.
Whether it be the disallowance of good time, the revocation of
parole, or the "arbitrary" denial of a pardon, 0 each action has the
same effect of postponing the prisoner's reappropriation of his liberty. As a result, the liberty interests in each situation are essentially the same. The Court in Dumschat chose to ignore those
similarities.
B. A Unilateral Hope
The Dumschat Court's propensity to draw fine distinctions, as
evidenced in its discussion of the differences between the parole
and pardon processes is consistent with the Court's analysis of appropriate sources of liberty interests. The Court observed that the
ground for a constitutional claim must be found in statutes or
other rules defining the obligations of authority, and it rejected the
respondents' argument that the Court had, in the past, looked at
other criteria to decide if liberty interests were present.oG This
finding conflicts with the Court's earlier language in Wolff v. McDonneZl, 0 7 where the Court stated: "The liberty that is worthy of
constitutional protection is not merely 'a statutory creation of the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 480-82.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 482.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 232 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Jago v. Van Curen, 102 S. Ct. 31 (1981), referred to Dumschat as
holding that the "arbitrary denial of an application for commutation of a life
sentence is permissible." Id. at 33 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. 101 S. Ct. at 2464. The constitutional claim or "entitlement" must meet the
threshold requirement- the existence of a legal right defined by independent
norms or rules. See notes 11, 71 &accompanying text supra. These independent norms and rules are both determinate and autonomous. The norms are
determinate in the sense that they provide courts with reasonably precise
standards to follow which serve to constrain judicial discretion. They are autonomous in that they are actually "legal" norms promulgated by reasonable
authorities and are distinguishable from norms of prudence, morals, or customs. Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner'sRight to Due Process: Meachum v.
Fano, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 405, 412 (1977).
107. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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State."'108 It should be noted that both concurring opinions in
Dumschat stressed that prior Court decisions had not suggested
that state law was the only source of a prisoner's liberty interest
worthy of constitutional protection, with Justice Brennan referring
to other eligible criteria in addition to state statutes, such as administrative practice, contractual arrangements, or mutual understandings. 109 In an earlier decision, Perry v. Sindermann,11o the
Court emphasized that mutually explicit understandings need not
have a basis in a written document to create a legitimate claim of
entitlement. And in Board of Regents v. Roth,"' the Court stated
that to determine whether due process requirements applied, one
had to look not to the weight but to the nature of the interest at
stake. The Roth Court viewed the words "liberty" and "property"
as "broad and majestic terms" that were purposely left to gather
meaning from experience, and it further asserted that the Court
had fully and finally rejected the "wooden distinction" between
rights and privileges that once seemed to govern the applicability
of due process rights.112
In deciding when due process protections would be warranted,
the Roth Court observed that a person clearly needed more than
just an abstract desire or a one-sided, unilateral expectation of a
benefit.11 3 The Court used similar language in Meachum v. Fano114
108. Id. at 558.

109. 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2465-66 (1981) (Brennan & White, JJ., concurring). Justice
White noted: "But neither Wolff nor Meachum is fairly characterized as suggesting that all liberty interests entitled to constitutional protection must be
found in state law." Id. at 2466 (White, J., concurring). The dissent in Dumschat was considerably less subtle, stating: "Surely the Court stumbles
when it states that liberty 'must be found in statutes or other rules defining
the obligations of authority'. . . , or when it implies that liberty has 'its roots
in State law."' Id. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These assertions by Justice Stevens are similar to those in his dissent in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976), where he stated:
[N] either the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign states create
the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects.... The relevant
state laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of
the citizen who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is
essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a
complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the
exclusive source.
Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

110. 408 U.S. 593, 601, 603 (1972).
111. 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
112. Id. at 571. The Court continued: "'[These words] relate to the whole domain
of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this nation knew
too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged."' Id. (quoting Na-

tional Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).

113. Id. at 577.
114. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). In Meachum, prisoners filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
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when it described a prisoner's expectation in not being arbitrarily
transferred to another prison, asserting that such an expectation
was too insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections." 5 It was this language that Chief Justice Burger incorporated into the Dumschat opinion when he referred to a
Connecticut felon's expectation of a pardon as simply "a unilateral
hope."" 6 However, that finding ignored the reality of the underlying situation in Dumschat and the two-sided, mutual nature of
Connecticut's system. Further, the benefit to the State of Connecticut from the unwritten compact with its prisoners was of a type
previously recognized by the Court. In Morrissey v. Brewer,"7 the
Court acknowledged that its decision to require procedural protections for parolees was based as much on the interests of society as
those of the prisoner. Chief Justice Burger stated:
The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him
to a normal and useful life within the law. Society thus has an interest in
not having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of
an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole given the breach of
parole conditions ....
And society has a further interest in treating the
parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to
arbitrariness. 1 1 8

Significantly, the Morrissey Court noted that a parolee based his
claim for due process protections upon his reliance on an implicit
promise from the state that his parole would be revoked only if he
failed to satisfy the parole conditions."

115.
116.
117.
118.

119.

9

In a like manner, if over a

§ 1983 (1976) alleging that they had been deprived of liberty without due process of law because the prison authorities had ordered them transferred to a
less favorable institution without an adequate factflnding hearing. 427 U.S. at
222. The Court observed ' That life in one prison is much more disagreeable
than in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution
with the more severe rules." Id. at 225. The Court asserted that to hold that
such arrangements [prisoner transfers] are within the reach of due process
clause protections would "place the Clause astride the day-to-day functioning
of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges." Id. at 228-29. If the individual states wished to follow a more liberal course, "whether by statute, by rule
or regulation or by interpretation of their own constitutions," the Court
stated that the decision was theirs to make. Id. at 229.
Id. at 228.
101 S. Ct. at 2464.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Id. at 484. Referring to the parolee's liberty interest, Chief Justice Burger
observed that it was no longer useful to try to deal with this issue in terms of
whether the parolee's liberty was a "right" or a "privilege," concluding. "By
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment" Id. at 482.
Id. at 482.
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period of years, seventy-five percent of a class receive favorable
treatment for performing in a prescribed manner, it is difficult to
dismiss their expectations of continued like treatment as unilateral solely because the longstanding terms of the implicit promises
are not set forth in writing. Nevertheless, the Dumschat Court
concluded that a state cannot be required to explain its reasons for
20
a decision when it is not required to act on prescribed grounds.
In other words, if a state sets down no rules, it is not required to
explain its actions.
C. Encumber For No Good Reason
"'There is nothing more corrosive to the fabric of a public insti-

tution such as a prison than a feeling among those whom it contains that they are being treated unfairly.""-2' It is important to
recall what precipitated the Dumschat litigation. 22 Dunschat
simply felt that he deserved to know why the Board of Pardons

rejected his application for commutation of his prison sentence
while continuing to consistently grant seventy-five to ninety percent of the applications of his peers. Dumschat wanted to know if

his denial of a pardon could have been based on procedural error1 23 and, if it was not, what action he might take to improve his
chances for obtaining release. The respondents assured the courts
that voluminous, detailed explanations were neither necessary nor
being sought. 2 4
Of course, the Dumschat Court's determination that there was

no liberty interest giving rise to due process protections foreclosed
consideration of the above procedural concerns. In light of the vol120. 101 S. Ct. at 2465.
121. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 589 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (quoting Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1283 (1st Cir.
1973)). Marshall also recalled Chief Justice Burger's language in Morrissey,
noting that "fair treatment... will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by
avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 484 (1972)).
122. In his original complaint, Dumschat sought not only a statement of reasons
from the board, but also access to all information available to the board in its
consideration of his applications. This additional relief was not granted by
the district court. The claim to access was dropped in the class action suit
and was not an issue before the Court. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 618
F.2d 216, 221 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct.2460 (1981).
123. It should be noted that the district court found that the possibility of arbitrary action by the Board of Pardons was real, given the procedural process
involved. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
124. Brief for Respondents at 30. "Respondents ask only that they be told why
they have been denied a sentence commutation when others who have compiled no better institutional records and committed crimes no less serious
have received commutations." Id.
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atile atmosphere present in many prison situations,125 perhaps addressing these concerns, by finding due process requirements
applicable, would be wise from a policy standpoint.
The Supreme Court has articulated three factors relevant in determining what process is due. 1 26 However, the Dumschat Court
chose not to apply these factors. The first factor requires examin27
ing the private interest that will be affected by the official action.
In Dumschat this interest related to the postponing of the prisoner's reappropriation of his liberty and was essentially the same
type of interest the Court found worthy of due process protection
in prior decisions. 128 The second factor relates to the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the interest as a result of the procedure(s) used. 12 9 The trial court found that there was such a potential risk in the Board of Pardons' procedure for review.130 The
third factor looks at the government's interest in the process, including the fiscal and administrative burdens imposed on the government as a result of additional or substitute procedural
requirements. 13' Here, the Du~mchat Court adopted the State of
Connecticut's argument that requiring its Board of Pardons to explain its rationale for denying an inmate a pardon would "encumber for no good reason" the pardon process. 1 32 Yet the Chairman
of the Board of Pardons testified that no significant fiscal or administrative burdens would be imposed upon the Board if the agency
were required to furnish life inmates with reasons for denial of
sentence commutations. 133 He also conceded that if the Board furnished a short statement of reasons for denial it would not limit
the Board's consideration of prison petitions or result in fewer sessions.13 4 Previous court decisions have indicated that even though
some administrative inconvenience might result if a brief summation of reasons underlying a decision were required, this factor
could not justify the denial of a written statement of reasons. 135
Further, the inability to provide any reasons might suggest that
125. See Potuto, Prison DisciplinaryProceduresand JudicialReview Under the

NebraskaAdministrative ProcedureAct, 61 NEB. L. REV. 1, 15 (1982).
126. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For a discussion of Mathews,
see note 51 supra.
127. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
128. See notes 83-105 & accompanying text supra.
129. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
130. See note 49 &accompanying text supra.
131. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
132. 101 S. Ct. 2460, 2464-65 (1981). See Brief for Petitioners at 9.
133. Brief for Respondents at 30 (citing the Joint Appendix at 71).
134. Id. at 30-31 (citing the Joint Appendix at 71).
135. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 786 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1971).
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the decision was, in fact, arbitrary. 36
Perhaps a policy argument which can be made against requiring reasons for parole or pardon denial is that furnishing reasons
could lead to anger, unrest, and violence within the prison system.
Some inmates, told that parole denial was due to factors beyond
their control,13 7 might lose the incentive to stay out of trouble or
might vent their frustrations on others. Thus to avoid this result, it
is better to keep all inmates uninformed. However, such a policy
sacrifices the valuable rehabilitative function' 3 8 which could be
served by informing inmates of the shortcomings in their applications so that they could better themselves for future parole or pardon consideration. The Dumschat Court failed to examine this
potential positive result of affording due process.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court was apparently once willing to
lend a sympathetic ear to prisoners with constitutional grievances, 3 9 it has, in the last five years, only occasionally chosen not
to defer to state government conduct with respect to prisoners'
rights questions. 40 As a result, many determinations regarding
prisoners' rights are left to the expertise of prison administrators
or to the will of state legislatures. Whether this may be viewed as
a good or bad result depends upon several factors. If the problems
which initially warranted federal court intervention into state
prison operations no longer exist,' 4 1 then giving decision-making
power back to the state courts, legislatures, and prison officials
would be appropriate. If, on the other hand, the same problems
continue to exist in state prisons, then the Dumschat and Greenholtz opinions signal hard times ahead for prisoners seeking help
with their grievances. Other recent cases,14 2 coupled with a tre136. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 40 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part).
137. See Dumschat v. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons, 432 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (D.
Conn. 1977), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2460 (1981). See also Joint Appendix at 49-52.
138. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
139. See Calhoun, supra note 2.
140. For an example of when the Supreme Court did not defer to state authorities,
see note 18 supra.
141. See notes 12-26 & accompanying text supra.
142. The Court recently upheld a 40-year prison sentence imposed on a Virginia
man for the distribution of nine ounces of marijuana worth about $200. The
Court observed that declaring the duration of prison sentences was a matter
of legislative prerogative. Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982). The Court in
Hutto based its ruling on a 1980 decision, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263
(1980), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a life sentence imposed on a Texas man who had committed three minor felonies over a nine
year period. In 1964 Rummel was convicted of presenting a credit card with
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mendous increase in prison population figures,143 do not present
an optimistic outlook for those persons ostracized for their sins
against society. New liberty interests for prisoners not on parole
or probation will be difficult to assert, absent an express grant from
the state. Unless one receives a life sentence for an overtime parking violation, 44 the Court may very well look the other way. The
Dumschat decision indicates the Court's willingness to continue to
tighten up threshold criteria for prisoners claiming violations of
their constitutional rights. The present Court may be sending 4a
message to prisoners in response to the swelling federal docket.1 5
Perhaps the message is that while prisoners may have access to
the courts, their efforts may well be an exercise in futility.
The Court's deference' 4 6 to Connecticut's power to choose its
own direction and mechanism for meting out justice represents an

143.

144.

145.
146.

intent to defraud another of approximately $80. In 1969 he was convicted of
passing a forged check with a face value of $28.36. In 1973 Rummel accepted
payment of $120.75 in return for his promise to repair an air conditioner. He
never repaired it and was charged with obtaining the money under false pretenses. He was also charged with being a habitual offender under the Texas
habitual offender statute, Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (1974), which provides a mandatory life sentence for any person convicted of three felonies.
The Court held that the mandatory life sentence imposed on Rummel did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th and 14th amendments and that Texas was entitled to make its own judgment as to the line
dividing felony theft from petty larceny. The Court noted that the Texas recidivist statute was nothing more than a societal decision that applied to a
person in Rummel's position who commits a third felony. After committing
the third offense, he is subjected to the serious penalty of life imprisonment,
subject only to the state's judgment as to whether to grant him parole. Id.
In Jago v. Van Curen, 102 S. Ct. 31 (1981), the Court, citing Dumschat, rejected the theory that a sort of "industrial common law" could give rise to a
liberty interest in the prisoner parole setting and reiterated that a constitutional claim must be based on firmer ground than mere "unspoken understandings" between the state and inmates. Id. at 34. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981) (Court upheld double celling made necessary
by unanticipated increase in prison population); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348
(3d Cir. 1981) (court upheld prisoner's placement in solitary confinement for
three months due to lack of space).
In an address given at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Chief Justice
Burger cited an increase in the prison population of the United States of approximately 150,000 in the last ten years alone (from 200,000 to 350,000). Address by Chief Justice Burger, More Warehouses, or Factories with Fences?
(Dec. 16, 1981); See DeTar Newbert, Chief Justice Burger Gives Major Address on Prison Reform, The Neb. Transcript, Dec. 1981, at 16-17.
In the Rummel opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that successful challenges
to prison sentences on the basis of undue harshness should be "exceedingly
rare" and offered the example of a life sentence for "overtime parking." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 274 n.l (1980).
See note 3 supra.
The Court observed. 'The Connecticut commutation statute, having no definitions, no criteria, and no mandated 'shalls,' creates no analogous duty or
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important step back towards a revival of the "hands off" doctrine.147 A quote by Justice Harlan, made over twenty years ago in
his dissent in Mapp v. Ohio,148 perhaps best sums up the apparent
attitude of the Court that decided Dumschat:
For us the question remains, as it has always been, one of state power,
not one of passing judgment on the wisdom of one state course or another
.... [T]his Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States
with an adamant rule which may embarrass them14 in
coping with their own
9
peculiar problems in criminal law enforcement.

David DeTar Newbert '83

constitutional entitlement." Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 101 S.
Ct. 2460, 2465 (1981).
147. See note 1 upra.
148. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
149. Id. at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

